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Abstract 
This paper takes up the familiar question of how one can explain support for European 
integration. One line of explanation builds on trade theory to theorize a calculus of 
economic costs and benefits. A second explanation draws on cognitive and social 
psychology to assess how individuals use political cues—grounded in ideology or elite 
communication—as a guide to complex issues. A third line draws on the psychology of 
group membership to consider how group identities, above all, national identities, bear on 
support for European integration. We use multi-level analysis to evaluate these 
explanations, and we conclude that perceptions of national identity are by far most 
powerful in structuring views on European integration. We find that the particular 
perception of national identity matters, as well as how identity is mobilized in national 
contexts. Thus, while strong national identity is consistent with support for European 
integration, exclusive national identity is a powerful brake on support. The effect of 
exclusive national identity varies across countries. It is strongest in countries where 
referenda on European integration have taken place. Referenda exacerbate conflicts within 
and among elites and empower single-issue anti-European protest movements, and this 
mobilizes exclusive national identity in an anti-European direction. 
Zusammenfassung 
Der vorliegende Beitrag befasst sich mit der bekannten Frage, wie sich die Unterstützung 
für die europäische Integration erklären lässt. Ein Erklärungsstrang stützt sich auf die 
Handelstheorie und zieht theoretische Schlüsse aus einer wirtschaftlichen Kosten-Nutzen-
Analyse. Ein anderer Erklärungsansatz basiert auf der kognitiven Psychologie und der 
Sozialpsychologie und untersucht, wie sich Individuen in komplexen Themenfeldern an 
politischen Voreinstellungen orientieren, die sie aus Weltanschauungen oder Elitendis-
kursen gewinnen. Ein dritter Ansatz geht von der Gruppenpsychologie aus und fragt 
danach, wie sich Gruppenidentitäten, vor allem nationale Identitäten, auf die Unterstützung 
für die europäische Integration auswirken. Wir evaluieren diese Erklärungsansätze mit 
Hilfe der Mehrebenenanalyse und kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass unterschiedliche Vor-
stellungen von nationaler Identität mit Abstand die stärkste Auswirkung auf Einstellungen 
zur europäischen Integration haben. Die individuelle Auffassung von nationaler Identität 
spielt dabei genau so eine Rolle wie die Bedeutung, die nationaler Identität im nationalen 
Kontext beigemessen wird. Während eine starke nationale Identität mit der Unterstützung 
der Europäischen Union einher geht, wirkt sich eine ausschließlich nationale Identität stark 
bremsend auf die Unterstützung aus. Der Einfluss ausschließlich nationaler Identität 
variiert von Land zu Land. Am stärksten ist er in den Ländern ausgeprägt, in denen 
Referenden zur europäischen Integration stattgefunden haben. Referenden verschärfen 
Konflikte innerhalb der und zwischen den Eliten und stärken monothematische, anti-
europäische Protestbewegungen. Das wiederum mobilisiert ausschließlich nationale 
Identitätsgefühle, die sich gegen die europäische Integration richten. 
 Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe* 
National Identity and Support for European Integration 
How can one explain support for European integration? The question is as old as the Euro-
pean Union, and it has been the subject of some one hundred articles, yet there is no schol-
arly consensus on the answer. One line of explanation builds on trade theory to theorize a 
calculus of economic costs and benefits. The presumption is that citizens are able to ration-
ally evaluate the economic consequences of European integration for themselves and for 
the groups of which they are part, and that such consequences drive their attitudes. A sec-
ond explanation draws on cognitive and social psychology to assess how individuals use 
political cues—grounded in ideology or in elite communication—as a short-hand guide to 
new and complex issues. A third line of explanation draws on the psychology of group 
membership and emotional attachment to consider how group identities and, above all, 
national identities, bear on support for European integration.  
Each line of explanation conceives of the object of attitude formation—the European 
Union—differently. The political-economic approach views the European Union as a 
regime that facilitates economic exchange, with profound distributional consequences 
arising among individuals from differences in asset mobility and among countries from 
institutional differences. The political cue approach views the European Union as an 
extension of domestic politics, and seeks explanations of public attitudes in domestic 
ideology or domestic political institutions, above all, national political parties. The national 
identity approach conceives of the European Union as a polity overarching established 
communities, and considers how this interacts with citizens’ conceptions of their identity.  
We find support for each of these lines of explanation, but we conclude that the latter is 
by far the most potent. Conceptions of in-groups and out-groups are immensely powerful 
in explaining public opinion on European integration. Rational evaluation of costs and 
benefits figure in our explanation, but they take second place after group attachments. 
European integration seems to provoke emotional responses on the part of citizens that 
engage communal identities. But such identities are not objective. Rather they are debated, 
contested, and constructed in national contexts.  
We proceed by stages. In the next section we summarize the main lines of theorizing and 
the models that have been put forward to account for public opinion on European integra-
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tion. In the following sections we operationalize key variables, and evaluate their statistical 
power in a multi-level analysis.  
Multi-level analysis is particularly appropriate for the questions we are asking. It is well 
suited to probing contextual effects in a multi-level polity. The core idea of multi-level 
governance is that public decision making is diffused across multiple territorial levels or 
contexts. Multi-level modeling allows an intimate dialog between theory and evidence in 
explaining the effects of such contexts. In this paper we consider public opinion on Euro-
pean integration as an interaction between individual-level attributes and the national and 
party-political contexts in which they are mobilized. To predict individual attitudes, we 
must therefore generalize about the contexts in which they are shaped. 
1. Theorizing Support for European Integration 
Political Economy  
The main thrust of European integration has been to sweep away barriers to economic 
exchange, facilitate mobility of capital and labor, and create a single European monetary 
authority. It is not surprising, therefore, that explanations of support for European integra-
tion have focused, above all, on subjective and objective economic factors at the individual 
and national level.  
There are many ways to hypothesize the economic effects of market liberalization, and 
yet more ways to build interactive terms to capture these effects. But there is a common, 
core expectation that, in general, market liberalization favors those with higher levels of 
income, education, and occupational skill (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998a, 
1998b; Inglehart 1970a; McLaren 2002; Carey 2002). There are several reasons for this. 
Market liberalization rewards those who have high levels of human capital and penalizes 
those with low levels of human capital (Becker 1976; Gabel 1998a, 43). Market 
liberalization increases the international substitutability of labor and consequently 
intensifies job insecurity, particularly for less skilled workers (Rodrik 1997). Market 
liberalization puts pressure on the viability of welfare systems (Huber and Stephens 2001; 
Scharpf 2000; Streeck 1996). And finally, market liberalization shifts the burden of 
taxation from mobile factors of production that have the option to exit the tax regime to 
immobile factors that do not (Scharpf 2000).  
Theories of support for European integration based on rational calculation of objective 
economic costs and benefits at the individual level have been extended in two directions. 
First, subjective evaluations, as well as objective factors, can be taken into account. Sec-
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ond, sociotropic evaluations concerning one’s group (in this case, nation), can be theorized 
alongside egocentric evaluations. The corresponding four lines of theorizing are repre-
sented in the cells of Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Political-economic Effects 
 objective subjective 
egocentric 1 2 
sociotropic 4 3 
 
Positive egocentric and sociotropic evaluations of economic well-being (cells 2 and 3 in 
Figure 1) are hypothesized to increase support for European integration (e.g. Anderson 
1998; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Rohrschneider 2002; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993, 510). 
The rationale for this is that European integration profoundly affects economic life 
chances, both for individuals and for countries, and is perceived to do so. Citizens who feel 
confident about the economic future—personally and for their country—are therefore 
likely to regard European integration in a positive light, while those who are pessimistic or 
fearful are likely to be euroskeptical.1  
A fourth stream of theorizing hypothesizes that citizens respond sociotropically to 
objective economic conditions (cell 4). That is to say, citizens are sensitive to their collec-
tive economic circumstances, as well as to those that affect them individually. We 
hypothesize that citizens in countries that are net recipients of European Union spending 
will be inclined to support, while those in donor countries will oppose European integra-
tion (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt forthcoming).  
Recent theorizing on the topic goes further, building on the types of capitalism literature 
to hypothesize how distinctive political-economic institutions frame the effects of Euro-
pean integration within a member state, and hence the response of its citizens (Ray forth-
coming; Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt forthcoming). Each type—market-liberal capitalism, 
the Rhine model, and the social democratic model—is composed of mutually reinforcing 
labor market, corporate governance, and welfare institutions. The costs of change for any 
                                                 
1   The connection between subjective economic evaluations and attitudes towards European integration is 
likely to be all the more apparent to respondents because they are measured in the same Eurobarometer 
survey. However this effect is limited for the measures of subjective economic evaluations that we use in 
this article because they are drawn from questions that are asked prior to questions concerning European 
integration or support for European integration.  
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model in any one of these areas are large because these institutions are complementary 
(Crouch and Streeck 1997; Hall and Gingerich 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001; Soskice 
1999). Each type is the result of deep-seated historical conflicts, and the resultant institu-
tions are embedded, both horizontally, in relation to other institutions, and vertically, in the 
expectations of those working within them. However, these models have not been equally 
influential in the process of European integration. The Rhine model, by virtue of the fact 
that it is the home model of the core countries in the European Community, and that it 
stakes out a middle ground between the weak redistribution of the liberal model and the 
strong redistribution of the social democratic model, has been the most influential.2 We 
therefore hypothesize that citizens in countries with the alternative types of capitalism—
i.e. the liberal and social democratic types—will be less supportive of European integra-
tion.  
Political-economic models assume that citizens are well-informed about the economic 
consequences of alternative institutional arrangements (McLaren 2002). Given the lack of 
even rudimentary knowledge of the EU on the part of many, even most, citizens (Anderson 
1998; Wessels 1995a), we need to explore further to find the sources of their support or 
opposition. In the next section, we examine political cues, which frame how citizens regard 
European integration, and in the following section we examine how support for European 
integration depends on basic identities. 
Political Cues 
Cognitive and social psychologists have shown that human capacity for calculation is far 
more limited than utilitarian models presume (Chong 2000; Kinder 1998; Simon 1985). 
This has directed attention to cognitive short-cuts and emotive anchors that provide essen-
tial and prior cues that help a person decide what is in his or her interest. Extending pre-
existing values or identities to new objects can be understood as rationalist aids to cogni-
tion and as the expression of a psychological need for consistency (Conover and Feldman 
1984; Feld and Grofman 1988; Feldman 1988; George 1979; Jennings 1992; Sears 1993; 
Sears and Funk 1991).  
                                                 
2   This is consistent with the median voter theorem. Of course, the outcomes in question are contested 
(Hooghe and Marks 1999). Several areas of economic integration have been characterized by “negative 
integration” biased towards the removing of barriers and the introduction of market competition – akin 
to the liberal model (Scharpf 1999). A weaker version of our argument would be that citizens, including 
those in countries with liberal or social democratic types of capitalism, perceive that their institutions are 
peripheral, and respond to European integration accordingly. 
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The cues that appear most relevant to European integration arise in the domestic arenas 
of EU member states, from political ideology and from political parties. The European 
Union has evolved into an encompassing political community, which is present in all areas 
of life that governments usually care to regulate. From capital flows to agriculture, trans-
portation, monetary policy, regional policy, environment, social regulation, education, and 
more recently, defense, immigration, and law and order, national governments share 
authority with the European Union. Deepening has gone hand in hand with the creation of 
a system of multi-level governance in which domestic groups, including national political 
parties, are involved in EU decision-making (Hooghe and Marks 1999). As European poli-
tics has become intertwined with domestic politics, it is worth looking to domestic politics 
to explain public opinion.  
Political choices in European domestic politics are structured by a left/right dimension 
tapping contestation concerning economic equality vs. economic freedom and the role of 
the state in regulating social and market outcomes. This dimension of contestation serves 
as a set of cues for taking positions on a range of subjects about which one is likely to have 
limited knowledge. Does left/right structure opinion on European integration (Gabel and 
Anderson 2002; Marks and Steenbergen forthcoming; van der Eijk and Franklin 1996)? 
For public opinion in the aggregate, the answer appears to be no. There is no robust lin-
ear association between citizens’ left/right ideology and their position on European inte-
gration. But aggregate findings may hide a multitude of sins—or causal patterns—and we 
need to take up the suggestion of Leonard Ray and Brinegar et al., who argue that the con-
nection between left/right ideology and support for European integration depends on the 
national context (Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt forthcoming; Marks forthcoming; Ray 
forthcoming). Their insight derives, once again, from the varieties of capitalism literature. 
If EU outcomes reflect the preferences of the median member state, then citizens in 
countries with social democratic systems of capitalism can expect to see their 
encompassing and highly redistributive welfare systems diluted. By the same logic, 
citizens in liberal capitalist countries can expect to be led in a more redistributive direction. 
This has obvious and compelling implications for how citizens on the left and right view 
European integration. In social democratic systems, the left will be opposed to European 
integration and the right will be supportive. In liberal market systems, the positions of left 
and right will be reversed.  
Political parties also provide cues. Research on political parties finds that the positions 
they stake out on European integration correspond to those of their supporters (Marks, 
Wilson, and Ray 2002; Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Wessels 1995b; Carrubba 2001). 
Steenbergen and Scott (forthcoming) argue that the causality runs mainly from parties to 
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voters, rather than the reverse, which accords with the perception that the views of individ-
ual citizens on European integration do not determine party positioning on this issue.  
National Identity 
Emotional or “gut” commitments can be extremely powerful in shaping views towards 
political objects, particularly when other cognitive frames of reference do not transparently 
apply (Chong 2000; Kinder and Sears 1981). In the words of Lauren McLaren, “Antipathy 
toward the EU is not just about cost/benefit calculations or about cognitive mobilization … 
but about fear of, or hostility toward, other cultures” (2002, 553). The logic of this 
approach is all the more persuasive because the European Union is not merely an interna-
tional regime intended to lower barriers to trade, reduce transaction costs of 
intergovernmental bargaining, or reap scale-efficiencies. On the contrary, the EU is a pol-
ity in the making, and as such it threatens not only the decisional autonomy of national 
institutions, but core values of national sovereignty and national identity.  
McLaren conceptualizes the consequences of this in terms of the degree to which citi-
zens fear cultural diversity and cultural degradation as a result of European integration. 
Feelings of xenophobia, even if not directed precisely at foreigners in the EU, can, she 
hypothesizes, explain individual support or opposition to the EU.  
One might also inquire into territorial identity. Diffuse support for the political commu-
nity—understood as “basic attachment to the nation beyond the present institutions of gov-
ernment” (Norris 1999, 10)—has long been hypothesized to be a requisite for a stable 
national state (Easton 1965; Smith 1992). Does this line of reasoning apply to the Euro-
pean Union?  
This line of theorizing is double-edged. First, we would expect that the stronger an indi-
vidual’s European identity, the greater her support for the European Union (Carey 2002; 
Citrin and Sides forthcoming; Risse 2002). Second, we would expect that the stronger an 
individual’s national identity, the weaker her support for the European Union. 
The first expectation is rooted in the literature linking community attachment to support 
for the political system. While identities are not cast in stone, there is much evidence that 
they are relatively stable over individual life spans, and so can be meaningfully considered 
to constrain more malleable preferences over regime support.  
The second expectation, by contrast, is contested. On the one hand, it is obvious to any-
one who reads the newspapers in Britain or Denmark, that opposition to European integra-
tion is often couched as defense of the nation against control from Brussels (on Britain, 
Usherwood 2002; on Denmark, Buch and Hansen 2002; on the role of the media in fram-
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ing EU debates, Semetko, de Vreese, and Peter 2000). Populist right-wing political parties 
in a growing list of countries, including France, Denmark, Italy, and Austria, tap 
nationalism and ethnocentrism to reject further integration, and since 1996 such parties 
have formed the largest reservoir of Euro-skepticism across the European Union (Hooghe, 
Marks, and Wilson 2002). Several studies find that individuals or countries with higher 
levels of national identity have lower levels of support for European integration. 
Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) show this for individuals in relation to a common 
European currency; Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) and Deflem and Pampel (1996) use 
country data to explore national variations. However, until an article by Sean Carey 
published in 2002, no-one had shown that national identity at the individual level had a 
significant negative effect on support for European integration.  
On the other hand, several writers argue that high levels of national identity are consis-
tent with support for European integration. Marks finds that attachment to one’s country is 
positively associated with attachment to the European Union in bivariate analysis (1999; 
see also Bruter forthcoming, Citrin and Sides forthcoming). Identities to different territorial 
communities are, in this view, mutually inclusive, rather than mutually exclusive. A person 
may, for example, have mutually compatible attachments to her city, Cardiff, her country, 
Wales, alongside Britain and the European Union (Haesly 2001). This is precisely what 
Diez Medrano and Gutiérrez find for Spain, where “people who identify strongly with 
Spain or/and their region also identify strongly with Europe. Spaniards have thus devel-
oped a sort of hyphenated identity with respect to Europe” (2001, 772). Along similar 
lines, van Kersbergen (2000) conceives of European allegiance as embedded in national 
allegiance. Citizens, he argues, identify with the European Union to the extent that they 
believe it strengthens the capacity of national states to achieve economic welfare and secu-
rity. While Carey (2002, 402), as noted, finds that national identity reduces support for 
European integration under controls, he also shows that the effect is small for individuals 
with high levels of European identity.  
One way of resolving these conflicting expectations is to inquire into the conditions 
under which national identity is politically mobilized into nationalism that sustains stark 
opposition to European integration (Marcussen et al. 1999). In some contexts, national 
identity may exist alongside, or even reinforce, support for European integration. In others, 
national identity is mobilized around the contested claim that the European Union threatens 
national institutions, weakens the national community, and undermines national sover-
eignty (Risse 2001). It is clear that countries vary widely in this respect, and we introduce a 
dummy variable describing whether or not a country has had a referendum on membership 
in the EU or on a major EU treaty, to capture the extent to which debate over European 
integration has been politicized. Such referenda increase the salience of European issues, 
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and, perhaps more importantly, limit the capacity of political parties and their leaderships 
to control debate. Unlike general elections, referenda highlight conflicts within, as well as 
among, political parties. General elections set the stage for the formation of governments—
and political parties, especially major political parties, exploit this to demand unity within 
their ranks. Referenda, by comparison, are unconstrained expressions of preference, with a 
reputation for spinning out of elite control (Leduc 2001). If this line of thinking is on the 
right track, one would expect national identity to play to a different tune in countries which 
have experienced one or more referenda on European integration. 
Models 
Table 1 summarizes ten explanatory models of public opinion on European integration. 
The table lists the dependent variables used in these analyses, the most powerful independ-
ent variables (in the boxes), the method, and the proportion of the variance explained. 
These models are, in our view, among the most interesting, influential, or original analyses 
to have appeared over the past decade. They also represent the major directions in theoriz-
ing. Direct comparison of results across these models is complicated because the depend-
ent variable varies, as do the population encompassed in the study, the time point of the 
data, and the method employed. But some general lessons can be learned.  
Most of these models, like the field as a whole, emphasize political-economic variables, 
notwithstanding that Ronald Inglehart’s pioneering work in this field was primarily non-
economic (1970a, 1970b). Values and identities are far less prominent, though we have 
oversampled on this dimension by including Sean Carey’s identity model and Lauren 
McLaren’s cultural threat model. The European Union is a moving target, and it is not sur-
prising that analyses of public opinion have changed over time. Up to the mid-1990s and 
the Maastricht Treaty it was fair to say that the EU was essentially a means to institution-
alize market integration, and analyses of public opinion sensibly reflected this. Matthew 
Gabel’s fine book, based on his dissertation, Interests and European Integration, from 
which we draw the ‘policy appraisal’ and ‘national political economy’ models, is primarily 
oriented to economic costs and benefits (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998a, 1998b), as 
is Anderson and Reichert’s ‘economic benefits model’ (1996). Another stream of work has 
examined cross-national variation in support in terms of aggregate economic factors (e.g. 
Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Carrubba 1997; Dalton and Eichenberg 1998; Eichenberg 
and Dalton 1993).  
In recent years, however, the debate over European integration has engaged culture and 
identity as elite conflict on the issue has widened and populist right parties have taken up  
 
 9 
Table 1a: Public Opinion on European Integration: Key Economic Models 
 Gabel and 
Palmer’s 
economic voting 
model (1995) 
Anderson and 
Reichert’s 
economic 
benefits model 
(1996) 
Gabel’s policy-
appraisal model 
(1998) 
Gabel’s national 
political 
economy model 
(1998) 
Brinegar, Jolly, 
and Kitschelt’s 
types of 
capitalism 
model (2002) 
Dependent  
variable 
Membership + 
unification 
Membership Membership Membership Interaction of 
perceived actual 
and desired 
speed 
Cognitive 
factors 
     
Egocentric 
economic 
factors 
Occupation, 
income, educa-
tion, proximity to 
border 
Occupationc, 
income, educa-
tion 
Occupationd, 
income, educa-
tion, proximity to 
border 
Human capitale, 
relative wagef, 
occupation 
 
Sociotropic 
economic 
factors 
Evaluation of 
national econo-
mya, national 
benefitb 
EU trade, budget 
returns 
 EU trade Types of 
capitalismi, 
structural funding 
Political 
factors 
   Political 
stabilityg 
Party cue 
Ideology/ 
political 
values 
 Post-materialism   Valuesj, left/right 
self-placement 
Cultural 
threat 
     
Identity      
Other  Length of mem-
bership, age, 
gender 
Gender, age Geopolitical  
securityh 
 
Country 
dummies 
YES NO YES YES NO 
Method OLS pooled time 
series 
OLS over 
different years 
OLS pooled time 
series 
OLS pooled time 
series 
OLS 
R2 .38 (EU) .04−.10 (EU) .13-.14 (EU) .11-.13 (EU) .17 (EU) 
a Measured by retrospective evaluation: weak effect. 
b Measured by benefit question: strong effect. 
c Occupation is a dummy for farmer. 
d Dummies: farmer, professional, manual worker. 
e Interaction of occupational category and personal income. 
f Relative to EU wage by occupation.  
g Voters of parties opposing democratic capitalism. 
h War deaths in WWII. 
i Items tapping wage bargaining system, labor market regime, welfare regime, welfare redistribution. 
j Views on welfare state, gender equality. 
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Table 1b: Public Opinion on European Integration: Key Non-economic Models 
 Anderson’s 
national proxies 
model (1998) 
Rohrschneider’s 
democratic 
performance 
model (2002) 
Steenbergen and 
Jones’ party cue 
model (2002) 
McLaren’s 
cultural threat 
model (2002) 
Carey’s identity 
model (2002) 
Dependent 
variable 
Membership 3 items tapping 
support for EU 
governmentc 
Membership + 
desired speed 
Membership + 
benefit 
Membership 
Cognitive 
factors 
  Opinion 
leadership 
 Opinion 
leadership 
Egocentric  
economic 
factors 
Evaluation of 
personal 
economy 
Evaluation of 
personal 
economy 
 Occupation, 
income, educa-
tion, proximity to 
border 
Occupation, 
income, educa-
tion; evaluation 
of personal 
economy 
Sociotropic  
economic 
factors 
Evaluation of 
national economy 
Evaluation: 
single market, 
national economy 
 Perceived 
economic threate 
Evaluation of 
national economy 
Political 
factors 
System supporta, 
government 
support, party 
supportb 
Perceptions EU 
representation, 
satisfaction EU 
democracy 
party cued   
Ideology/  
political 
values 
 Post-materialism  Left/right self-
placement 
 
Cultural 
threat 
   Perceived  
cultural threatf 
Perceived  
cultural threatg 
Identity     National prideh, 
territorial 
attachmenti 
Other      
Country 
dummies 
NO NO NO YES YES 
Method OLS OLS, MLA MLA OLS ordered LOGIT 
R2 .09−.20 (nat) .23−.40 (nat) CALCULATE 
(EU) 
.17−.21 (EU) 59% correct (EU) 
a  Satisfaction with national democracy. 
b Voted for establishment party. 
c (1) EU government responsible to EU Parliament? (2) More power for EP good/bad? (3) EP more/less important role? 
d Level of EU support among political parties, constituting a cue to party supporters. 
e Minorities abuse social benefits. 
f Religious practices of minorities threaten our way of life. 
g EU threatens national identity; language. 
h Interaction: national pride + exclusive national identity. 
i Local, regional, national, European. 
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the cause of Euroskepticism (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Taggart 1998). We detect 
a corresponding turn in the analysis of public opinion, and a greater sensitivity to the view, 
espoused by a scholar sympathetic to rational calculus, that, “Individual preferences are 
guided by both [pre]dispositions and incentives. This means that, in selecting between any 
set of alternatives, an individual may, by virtue of his group identifications and values, be 
predisposed to favor one alternative independently of the current incentives associated with 
the alternatives” (Chong 2000, 74; see also Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Sears and 
Funk 1991). In a longitudinal analysis of twenty-five years of EU public opinion, Bernhard 
Wessels concludes that, “the impact of stratifying characteristics—education and occupa-
tion—on attitudes towards the EC has declined,” while that of political values such as 
left/right, postmaterialism, and party identification has increased (Wessels 1995a, 135). 
Sean Carey’s ‘identity model’ (2002) elaborates different measures of regional, national 
and European identity, and finds that they powerfully structure EU public opinion. Lauren 
McLaren’s ‘cultural threat model’ demonstrates that “attitudes toward the European Union 
tend to be based in great part on a general hostility toward other cultures” (2002, 564).  
Several models root public opinion towards European integration in the domestic politi-
cal context. Anderson’s ‘national proxies model’ (1998), Carrubba (2001), 
Rohrschneider’s ‘democratic performance model’ (2002) and Steenbergen and Jones’ 
‘party cue model’ (2002) all draw attention to national political-institutional variables, of 
which party support or party cue appear especially powerful.  
Analysts have sought in different ways to handle the multi-level structure of the data. All 
are aware, of course, that public opinion varies across countries as well as across individu-
als. One approach is to run the same model for as many countries as there are in the data 
set (Rohrschneider 2002; Anderson 1998). Another is to deal with one level only or with 
each level separately (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Bosch and Newton 1995; Carrubba 
2001; Dalton and Eichenberg 1998; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000; 
Wessels 1995a). A standard strategy is to absorb clustering of residuals by country in a 
series of dummy variables (e.g. Gabel 1998a). Such variables are sphinx-like in that they 
increase the variance explained by the model, but tell us little or nothing substantively. 
Finally, there are two analyses that, like the analysis of this paper, use multi-level analysis. 
Both are represented in Table 1. 
Models that account for the most variance sometimes rely on independent variables that 
appear uncomfortably close to the dependent variable. Most writers, including those 
selected here, face up explicitly to the problem of establishing direction of causality. One 
may ask whether evaluations of the extent to which respondents feel represented by the 
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European Parliament influence support for European integration or result from it?3 Given 
the well-documented lack of knowledge of the European Parliament among most EU citi-
zens, it seems possible that responses to a question about whether the European Parliament 
protects one’s interests may issue from more diffuse attitudes, including those towards the 
European Union generally. Similarly, it seems strained to consider the perception of 
whether one’s country has benefited from integration as an independent variable, espe-
cially because it is sometimes used together with membership as indicator for support. The 
authors listed in Table 1 have evidently thought through such concerns. In this paper we do 
not include European identity among our independent variables on the grounds that it plau-
sibly results from, as well as contributes to, support for European integration. 
2.  Method and Data 
Data for the dependent variable and the individual-level predictors come from Euro-
barometer 54.1, for which fieldwork took place in the fifteen member states of the Euro-
pean Union in the Fall of 2000.4 We include only respondents for whom we have values on 
all variables in the full model, so that we have a common base of reference for evaluating 
our consecutive explanatory models.5 Our measures for the dependent variable and the pre-
dictors are described in Table 2. 
To measure support for European integration we combine three indicators that tap basic, 
complementary elements of support: principle of membership, desired speed of integration, 
and direction of future integration. Whether membership of the European Union is good, 
bad, or neither good nor bad is the most consistently asked question in Eurobarometer sur-
veys since 1970. As Table 1 shows, it is also the most widely used dependent variable, 
despite the fact that it forces responses into three categories. More recently, Eurobarometer 
has added questions tapping respondent’s views on the desired speed of European integra-
tion and on the desired importance of the European Union in one’s daily life. The resulting 
index is more fine-grained than any of its constituent elements, and approximates a con-
                                                 
3   To be fair, a large part of the problem has its roots in the survey instrument, and the difficulty 
researchers have in finding appropriate indicators of the concepts they wish to measure. 
4   Harald Hartung. 2002. Eurobarometer 54.1: Building Europe and the European Union. The European 
Parliament, Public Safety, and Defense Policy, November-December 2000. Commission of the European 
Community. This dataset is available from Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and 
Social Research. We exclude Luxembourg (N = 15,637).  
5   This brings the number of cases to 7222. The largest reduction in cases is due to Party Cue. A fairly 
large number of respondents (6387) do not report which party they intend to vote for at the next general 
election, and we need this information to construct Party Cue. The second-largest reduction is due to 
Left/Right (3294). Our model is robust across the full sample and the restricted sample. No variable 
reported here shifts in sign or significance.  
 13 
tinuous measure of the level of support for European integration. The results we report 
below are robust across these alternative measures of the dependent variable.  
 
Table 2: Variable Descriptions 
Support for 
European 
integration 
An index of three items: (1) “Generally speaking, do you think that [our country’s] mem-
bership of the European Union is (a bad thing, neither good nor bad, a good thing)?”, (2) the 
desired speed of European integration (1 = integration should be brought to a “standstill”; 7 = 
integration should run “as fast as possible”), and (3) “In five years’ time, would you like the 
European Union to play (a less important role, same role, a more important role) in your daily 
life?” The correlation is 0.375 between (1) and (2), 0.420 between (1) and (3), and 0.470 
between (2) and (3). Standardized item α = 0.687. The index is recoded as a 0-100 
thermometer scale, with higher scores indicating greater support for European integration.  
Education Measured by the age of respondents when they stopped full-time education (D.8), and 
recoded into a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (up to 15 year of age), to 2 (16-19 years old), 3 
(20 years old or more) and 4 (still studying).  
Professional/
Manager 
A dummy variable where a value of 1 indicates that respondent is professional (self-em-
ployed or employed), general manager, or business proprietor.  
Manual 
Worker 
A dummy variable where a value of 1 indicates that respondent is a skilled or unskilled man-
ual worker, or non-desk employee (e.g. salesman, driver). 
Personal 
Economic 
Prospects 
An index of three items measuring respondents’ expectations (worse, same, better) concern-
ing their future life, the financial situation in their household, and their job situation (Q.501, 
Q503, Q505.). Correlations vary between 0.486 and 0.531; standardized item α = 0.722. This 
3-point variable is centered on the sample mean. 
National 
Economic 
Prospects 
An index of two items measuring respondents’ expectations (worse, same, better) concerning 
the economic situation and the employment situation in their country (Q.502, Q504.) Corre-
lation is 0.530. This 3-point variable is centered on the sample mean. 
Perceived 
Economic 
Threat 
Scores from two-factor analysis (principal components, varimax rotation assuming orthogo-
nality) of responses to Q.33: “Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the 
European Union. Here is a list of things which some people say they are afraid of. For each 
one, please tell me if you personally are currently afraid of it, or not (currently afraid, don’t 
know, not currently afraid)”? Items with a score greater than 0.40 on this factor are: “Other 
countries joining the EU will cost too much money,” “Less subsidies from the European 
Union for [our country],” “Richer countries pay more for the others,” “More difficulties for 
[nationality] farmers,” and “The transfer of jobs to countries with higher production costs.” 
Scores on this variable vary between -2.699 and +2.035.  
Structural 
Funds 
Country receipts per capita from EU structural funds and cohesion policy (1994-1999 period; 
1994 prices). The variable is centered on its mean. Source: http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/..... 
 Type of 
Capitalism 
Categorization along a two-dimensional 2x3 table: type of national production system (liberal 
market economies, mixed systems, organized market economies—as defined by Hall and 
Soskice (2001)) and the extent of welfare redistribution (limited, medium, extensive—as 
measured by the Gini index after income taxation and social benefits.) Source: Gourevitch 
and Hawes (2001.) We allocate scores to countries depending on their distance from the 
median category (mixed systems, medium redistribution) whereby 2 is allocated to the 
median category, 1 to countries in adjacent cells, and 0 to countries two cells removed. 
Left/Right 
Ideology 
Self-placement on a 10-point scale, ranging from 1 (left) to 10 (right), and centered on the 
sample mean. 
14 
Scand*Left/ 
Right 
Interactive term between Left/Right Ideology and Scandinavia, a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 for respondents from Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. 
Party Cue A measure of party support for European integration ranging from 1 (party leadership is 
strongly opposed) to 7 (party leadership is strongly in favor). Source: means for parties are 
calculated from 123 party expert evaluations of the positions of party leaderships on Euro-
pean integration in the fourteen largest member states; data collected by Gary Marks and 
Marco Steenbergen (http:\\www. unc.edu/~marks). Party means are matched with individual 
respondents who indicate which party they intend to vote for in the next general election 
(Eurobarometer 54.1, D.4). We center this 7-point variable on the sample mean.  
National 
Attachment 
An index of two items measuring the intensity of attachment to country (not at all attached, 
not very attached, fairly attached, very attached) (Q.803) and of national pride (not at all 
proud, not very proud, fairly proud, very proud) (Q.6). The index ranges from 1 (very weak 
national attachment) to 7 (very strong national attachment). Inter-item r = 0.465; standardized 
item α = 0.635. We center this 7-point variable on the sample mean. 
Exclusive 
National 
Identity 
Question Q.23: “In the near future, do you see yourself as (1) [nationality] only, (2) [nation-
ality] and European, (3) European and [nationality], or (4) European only?” This 4-point 
variable is centered on the sample mean. 
Referendum*
Exclusive 
National 
Identity 
An interactive term between Exclusive National Identity and Referendum, a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 for countries that had at least one referendum on European issues 
prior to 2001. Source: Hug (2002), Hug and Sciarini (2000); Leduc (2001). 
Multi-
culturalism 
We use the following question (Q.399): “Thinking about the enlargement of the European 
Union to include new countries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with the following 
statement …’With more member countries, Europe will be culturally richer (tend to disagree, 
don’t know, tend to agree).’” This 3-point variable is centered on the sample mean. 
Perceived 
Cultural 
Threat 
Scores from two-factor analysis (principal components, varimax rotation assuming orthogo-
nality) of responses to Q.33 (see Subjective Economic Security above): “Some people may 
have fears about the building of Europe, the European Union. Here is a list of things which 
some people say they are afraid of. For each one, please tell me if you personally are cur-
rently afraid of it, or not (currently afraid, don’t know, not currently afraid)”? Items that score 
higher than 0.40 on this factor are “The loss of our national identity and culture,” “Our lan-
guage being used less and less,” “The end of [national currency],” and “The loss of social 
benefits.” Scores on this variable vary between -2.199 and +2.125. 
Opinion 
Leadership 
An index based on two variables that tap how often respondents discuss political matters with 
friends (Q.2), and how often they try to persuade friends, relatives, or fellow workers from 
their views (Q.3). The index ranges from 1 (very low) to 4 (very high opinion leadership). 
Inter-item r = 0.331. We reverse the 4-point scale and center on the sample mean. Our coding 
scheme replicates the Mannheim Eurotrends barometer.  
Knowledge An index of subjective (Q.14) and objective knowledge (Q.24, Q.32) of EU politics ranging 
from 1 (no knowledge) to 20 (perfect knowledge). Inter-item r = 0.412. This 20-point vari-
able is centered on the sample mean. 
Age Respondent’s age (in years) (D.11).  
Gender Respondent’s gender (1 = male, 2 = female) (D.10). 
Note: Unless otherwise stated, all data are from Eurobarometer 54.1. Q and D notations in brackets refer to 
the question codes in the Eurobarometer codebook. 
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The first set of variables in Table 2 operationalizes political economy hypotheses. The first 
three variables (education, professional/manager and manual worker) relate to cell one in 
Table 1. We operationalize subjective economic factors with Personal Economic Prospects 
(cell two) and with National Economic Prospects and Perceived Economic Threat (cell 
three). We have two country-level measures of objective national economic benefit (cell 
four). EU cohesion policy (Structural Funds) constitutes about one-third of the EU budget. 
The last round of negotiations took place in 1999, one year before the public opinion sur-
vey.6 Type of Capitalism is a rough measure of the institutional costs of national adaptation 
to EU policy for production regimes (Hall and Soskice 2001; Soskice 1999) and social 
policy regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001). The high corre-
lation between these dimensions of capitalism makes it sensible to combine them in one 
index (Gourevitch and Hawes 2001).  
We measure political cues with Left/Right Ideology, a variable that interacts Left/Right 
Ideology with Scandinavia (in the expectation that the positioning of left and right is dis-
tinctive in Scandinavian countries), and with Party Cue. The data for Party Cue were col-
lected via an expert survey conducted in 1999 by the University of North Carolina Center 
for European Studies at Chapel Hill (http://www.unc.edu\~gwmarks). This dataset contains 
information on the position on European integration for 125 political parties in fourteen 
member states (excluding Luxembourg), of which we use data for 114 parties. 
We measure various aspects of identity. National Attachment and Exclusive National 
Identity are adapted from Marks (1999) and Carey (2002). In accord with our expectations 
about the role of referenda in fomenting opposition to European integration, we interact 
Exclusive National Identity with Referendum. Multiculturalism and Perceived Cultural 
Threat allow us to evaluate hypotheses linking the level of support for European integra-
tion to respondents’ feelings concerning cultural diversity and cultural degradation.  
Finally, we include four control variables. Consistent with prior work on support for 
European integration, we expect support to be greater among opinion leaders, respondents 
knowledgeable about European politics, men, and younger individuals.  
3. Results 
Which of these factors help us shed light on support for European integration? We employ 
multi-level analysis instead of standard regression analysis because we wish to probe 
variation not merely at the individual level, but also at the level of political parties and 
                                                 
6   This is the most commonly used indicator for national economic benefit, though some scholars employ 
overall budget returns, which are highly correlated with cohesion spending (R = 0.96).  
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countries. Our presumption is that political parties and countries are irreducable political 
contexts that interact with individual attributes to produce political effects. We must there-
fore account for variation across these contexts to explain variation among citizens. To the 
extent that individuals are clustered in parties and countries, they should not be regarded as 
independent units of analysis. Ignoring this is likely to bias estimates because residuals will 
co-vary across the higher-level groups. By specifying predictors for clustered data across 
the relevant clusters, one is less likely to misspecify parameters (Steenbergen and Jones 
2002; Kreft and de Leeuw 1998; Snijders and Bosker 1999).  
An empty ANOVA model (hereafter described as the base model) reveals significant 
clustering of support at the party and country level. Table 3 splices the total variance 
among individuals into discrete variance components. The individual level encompasses 
78.6 percent of the variance across the sample; the party level encompasses 9.1 percent; 
and the country level 12.3 percent.  
Table 4 presents multi-level estimates and OLS estimates for the variables described in 
Table 2. Each of the theories we discussed finds some support in our results. We see im-
mediately that identity and cost/benefit calculations are complementary for understanding 
public opinion on European integration. Explanations that ignore one or the other under-
value the two-sidedness of human motivation (Chong 2000; Hooghe 2002; Kinder 1998).  
How well do these theories explain variance at each level? The first two columns in 
Table 4 present the full multi-level model, which accounts for 22.7 percent of the variance 
at the individual level, 92.6 percent of the variance at the party level and 91.2 percent of 
the variance at the country level.7 This is a large improvement over the base model. The 
reduction in chi-squared from the base to the full model is 2009, using 21 degrees of free-
dom, and far exceeds standard benchmarks of significance. The model captures the bulk of 
variance at the party and country level, and a sizeable chunk of variance across individual 
respondents. The total variance explained is 37.5 percent.8  
                                                 
7   Our results are robust across alternative operationalizations of our dependent variable. When we take re-
sponses to the membership question alone as our dependent variable, we explain 19.1 percent of variance at 
the individual level, 89.5 percent of the variance at the party level and 74.3 percent of the variance at the 
country level. The total variance explained is 29.8 percent. With the exception of Type of Capitalism, 
which loses significance in the full model, the pattern of (in)significance for all other variables remains the 
same. 
8   The concept “explained variance” is well defined for our full model because it estimates fixed, not random, 
effects (Kreft and de Leeuw 1998, 115). This is one of the chief virtues of eschewing random effects. 
While model fit is likely to be weaker under fixed effects, for all but two variables, Left/Right Ideology and 
Exclusive National Identity, we do not have a prior expectation that coefficients will vary across countries 
or parties. We choose to model the contextual effects of these variables by creating interactive terms in a 
fixed effects model. For all other variables, we expect constants, but not coefficients, to vary across our 
higher level units. Hence, we gain clarity and simplicity at little cost by not fitting random slopes for vari-
ables across our higher-level units. Estimates produced by a random effects model can, however, be a use-
ful diagnostic tool. For example, we use country coefficients for Exclusive National Identity produced in a 
random effects model as a dependent variable in a separate structural equations analysis. 
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Table 3: ANOVA (base model) 
 Multilevel estimates  
 unstandardized coefficients standard errors 
Fixed Effects   
Constant 65.389*** 2.764 
Variance Components   
Country-Level 95.023** 40.533 
Party-Level 70.657*** 13.204 
Individual-Level 608.168*** 10.207 
-2* Log Likelihood 67019  
Note: ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001. 
 
Table 4:  Support for European Integration  
 Multilevel estimates Regression estimates 
 unstandardized 
coefficients 
standard 
errors 
unstandardized 
coefficients 
standard 
errors 
Constant (Fixed Effects) 64.191*** (2.056)  65.856*** (1.740) 
National Identity (Fixed Effects)     
National Attachment 1.721*** (0.241) 1.780*** (0.239) 
Exclusive National Identity -7.292*** (0.446) -7.506*** (0.407) 
Referendum*Exclusive National Identity -2.963*** (0.463) -2.905*** (0.184) 
Multiculturalism 4.437*** (0.319) 4.405*** (0.320) 
Perceived Cultural Threat -4.456*** (0.272) -4.557*** (0.272) 
Political Cues (Fixed Effects)     
Party Cue 2.220*** (0.237) 2.313*** (0.180) 
Left/Right Ideology -0.374∗ (0.161) -0.429** (0.144) 
Scandinavia*Left/Right Ideology 1.638*** (0.334) 1.595*** (0.293) 
Political Economy (Fixed Effects)     
Education 0.849** (0.357) 0.547 (0.351) 
Professional/Manager 0.902 (1.022) 0.722 (1.032) 
Manual Worker -0.638 (0.656) -0.935 (0.662) 
Structural Funds 7.344*** (1.336) 7.490*** (0.457) 
Type of Capitalism 2.675** (1.149) 2.310*** (0.398) 
Personal Economic Prospects 2.898*** (0.646) 3.194*** (0.648) 
National Economic Prospects 2.804*** (0.466) 2.602*** (0.465) 
Perceived Economic Threat -2.474*** (0.260) -2.348*** (0.260) 
Control Variables (Fixed Effects)     
Opinion Leadership -0.006 (0.311) 0.157 (0.311) 
Knowledge 0.514*** (0.079) 0.446*** (0.079) 
Gender -0.021 (0.019) -0.034° (0.019) 
Age -0.656 (0.532) -0.887° (0.536) 
Variance Components     
Country-Level 8.272* (3.930)   
Party-Level 5.248** (2.049)   
Individual-Level 470.385*** (7.873)   
-2 x Log Likelihood 65010    
R2   0.36  
Adjusted R2   0.36  
Note: ° = p < .10, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001. 
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The right-hand columns in Table 4 report OLS estimates and their standard errors. The 
signs of the OLS estimates are no different from the multi-level estimates. However, the 
standard errors for these OLS estimates do not take account of the clustering of observa-
tions at the party and country levels, and are therefore underestimated. The problem is 
most severe for variables that tap variance at the party and/or country level: Referen-
dum*Exclusive National Identity, Party Cue, Structural Funds, and Type of Capitalism. 
There are also some differences in parameters. The parameter for Education becomes sig-
nificant in multi-level analysis, while the parameters for Gender and Age become insignifi-
cant. In the remainder of this paper we report multi-level results. 
Because the metrics for our independent variables vary, the relative size of their effects 
is not directly evident from Table 4. Figure 2 reveals how variation on ten independent 
variables translates into levels of support for European integration. The solid boxes 
encompass the inter-quartile range for each independent variable, and the whiskers encom-
pass the 5th to the 95th percentiles, holding all other independent variables at their means. 
For example, an individual at the 25th percentile on Referendum*Exclusive Nationalism has 
a score of 62.3 on support for European integration, and an individual at the 75th percentile 
scores 70.3. The variables towards the left of Figure 2 have the largest effects across their 
interquartile range. 
 
Figure 2: Effects of Independent Variables 
Interquartile range for independent variable in fully specified model where all other variables are held at their means. 
5 percent - 95 percent range for independent variable in fully specified model where all other variables are held at their means. 
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National Identity 
The most powerful variables in our model tap various aspects of national identity: Refer-
endum*Exclusive National Identity, Cultural Insecurity, Exclusive Nationalism, and Multi-
culturalism. With respect to the base model, they explain 18.9 percent of variance at the 
individual level, 65.5 percent of country variance, and 58.1 percent of party variance 
across our sample (national identity model in Table 5).  
The paradox that we identified earlier is starkly evident. The greater citizens’ pride in 
and attachment to their nation, the greater is their support for European integration.9 The 
parameter for National attachment is significant and positive in our full model, as it is in 
the absence of controls. The simple correlation is 0.025, which is significant at the 0.05 
level. The association is robust across countries, with the thought-provoking exceptions of 
Denmark and Britain (see below).10 We already know, as noted earlier, that National 
Attachment is positively associated with European attachment.11 Caution is warranted in 
interpreting our results here, because National Attachment is slippery under alternative 
model specifications. If we add a measure of European attachment to the model—a some-
what dubious undertaking given its close causal proximity to support for European inte-
gration and its quite strong positive association (0.319) with National attachment—the sign 
for National attachment becomes negative. But we can say, cautiously but emphatically, 
that national attachment is not mutually exclusive with either European attachment or sup-
port for European integration.  
This finding is consistent with research in social psychology and anthropology, which 
shows that individuals often choose to identify with several territorial communities simul-
taneously (Brewer 1993, 2001; Citrin and Sides forthcoming; Diez Medrano and Gutiérrez 
2001). As case study after case study has affirmed, it is possible, and not at all unusual, for 
citizens to have multiple identities—to feel, for example, strongly Catalan, Spanish, and 
European—at one and the same time (Llera 1993; Marks and Llamazares forthcoming; 
Melich 1986; on multiple identities in Belgium, see e.g. Billiet, Doutrelepont and 
Vandekeere 2000; Maddens, Beerten, Billiet 1994.) 
Multiple identities in Europe are normal (Bruter forthcoming; Duchesne and Frognier 
1995; Laffan 1996; Marks 1999; Risse forthcoming; Wallace 1990, 33). When asked 
directly about this in Fall 1992 (Eurobarometer 38), 62 percent of respondents considered 
                                                 
9   As we detail in Table 2, National Attachment sums responses to a question asking respondents how 
attached they are to their country, and a question asking respondents how proud they are of their country. 
Our results are robust across these components. 
10  The association is also negative but insignificant at the .10 level for Sweden and for Spain. 
11  Strong attachment to Europe goes hand in hand with strong attachment to one’s country (R = .319), and 
this relationship is robust across countries, with one exception—Britain (R = .020, p = .673). 
20 
“a sense of European identity as being compatible with a sense of national identity,” while 
23 percent envisage their “country’s identity disappearing over time if a European Union 
came about” (Marks 1999; Reif 1993). Moreover, comparing national and European 
attachment through the nineties, Citrin and Sides find that a dual sense of attachment 
increased from 46 percent in 1991 to 56 percent in 1999, while exclusive attachment to the 
nation decreased from 41 to 31 percent. They conclude that “even in an era in which per-
ceptions of the European Union as successful seemed to decline, the tendency to identify 
with both nation and Europe increased” (Citrin and Sides forthcoming, 8-9). Marks (1999) 
argues that national identities are embedded or nested in, rather than antithetical to, 
European identity (see also van Kersbergen 2000; Diez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001). 
Risse conceptualizes the relationship as akin to a marble cake in which multiple identities 
are meshed together rather than nested. While national, regional and local identities in 
Europe contain a fair dose of Europeanness, the meaning of European identity may vary 
profoundly across territorial contexts (Risse 2002). Whether one conceives of the relation-
ship as embedded, nested or enmeshed, there is broad consensus that a strong sense of 
national identity is consistent with European identity and support for European integration.  
This is a point of departure for understanding European integration, but we still need to 
examine the claim that national identity is, at the same time, a powerful brake on European 
integration. If national identity is Janus-faced, under what circumstances will it collide 
with European integration? We can gain some insight into this by looking more closely at 
the variable Exclusive National Identity. A virtue of this Eurobarometer question is that it 
compels respondents to place either European or national identity above the other, and 
separates those who say they think of themselves as “only British (or French, etc.)” from 
those who say they have some form of multiple identity.12 Those who attest exclusive 
national identity are distinctive. Average support for European integration is just 52.2 on 
our thermometer scale for respondents who have exclusive national identity, but varies 
between 74.1 and 79.5 across the remaining categories. Were we to operationalize this 
variable as a simple dummy with exclusive nationalists in one category and the rest in the 
other, we would not appreciably weaken its power. 
So exclusive national identity is key. But the effect of exclusive national identity on 
support for European integration varies sharply across countries. In some countries, citi-
zens who have exclusive national identity are only slightly more Euroskeptic than those 
with multiple identities. In others, exclusive national identity is powerfully associated with 
Euroskepticism. In the UK, citizens with exclusive national identity have a level of support 
for European integration that is on average 32.4 points lower (on our 100 point scale) than 
                                                 
12  In our sample, 40.5 percent describe themselves as “national only,” 50.2 percent as “national and 
European,” 6.2 percent as “European and national,” and 3.1 percent as “European only.”  
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those with some kind of multiple identity. In Portugal, at the other extreme, the difference 
is 9.7 points. Figure 3 illustrates the varying power of exclusive national identity across 
countries by mapping the parameters for Exclusive National Identity for each country 
according to their deviation from the sample parameter (mean = −11.64). The steeper the 
slope (i.e. the further towards the left of the figure), the more Exclusive National Identity 
affects support for European integration; the flatter the slope, the weaker is its force. Thus, 
a unit change in Exclusive National Identity depresses support for European integration by 
17.5 percent in the UK (± 2.5 percent), against by 6.3 percent in Portugal (± 2.4 percent). 
 
Figure 3: Country Coefficients for Exclusive National Identity 
How can one explain the differences illustrated in Figure 3? What is it about the country 
context that mobilizes – or dampens – the effect of exclusive national identity for support 
for European integration? Several authors explore the subtle ways in which national iden-
tity is framed and politically mobilized in relation to European integration (Bruter forth-
coming; Buch and Hansen 2002; Carey 2002; Fuchs, Gerhards, and Roller 1995; Hermann, 
Brewer, and Risse forthcoming; Kriesi et al. 1999; Marcussen et al. 1999; McAllister and 
Studlar 2000; McLaren 2001, 2002; Merlingen 2001; Risse 2001; Semetko, de Vreese, and 
Peter 2000; Usherwood 2002). We theorized above that EU referenda campaigns politicize 
national identity with respect to European integration because they facilitate the open 
expression of conflicts within and among political parties and because they lead to single-
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issue anti-European protest movements. A variable designed to capture this is powerful 
under the controls we exert in our multi-level model (Table 4 and Figure 2). Countries that 
have had a referendum are starred in Figure 3. Countries where exclusive national identity 
has the greatest bite – i.e. those to the left in Figure 3 – tend to be those in which a referen-
dum on European integration has taken place.  
To probe further into the causal role of referenda, we need to relax the assumption that 
referenda are exogenous. Do they exert independent influence on the mobilization of 
exclusive nationalism against European integration, or are they part of a larger political 
process that both initiates referenda and mobilizes exclusive national identity against 
European integration?  
Our answer is that both processes take place. Our expectations here are based on the lit-
erature on American public opinion (Druckman 2001; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 
2002; Jennings 1992; Kinder 1998; Zaller 1992), the analysis of referendums in Europe 
(Buch and Hansen 2002; Cristin and Hug 2002; Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 1994; Hug 
2002; Hug and Sciarini 2000; Leduc 2001), and our own prior research on political parties 
and elite/public divides on European integration (Hooghe forthcoming; Marks and Wilson 
2000; Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002; Marks forthcoming.) They can be encapsulated in 
three statements. First, we expect elites, particularly party elites, to be decisive in shaping 
public opinion. The greater the divisions among elites and between elites and the public on 
European integration, the more exclusive national identity will be mobilized against 
European integration (on polarization effects in public opinion, see Zaller 1992, 97-117). 
Second, the greater intra-elite and elite/public divisions, the more governments come under 
pressure to hold referenda on European integration.13 Third, as we have argued above, we 
                                                 
13  With the exception of Ireland, and the partial exception of Austria and Denmark, referenda on European 
integration have taken place at the discretion of governments. Referenda on European integration in 
Ireland have been held under Article 46.2 which requires votes in both houses of its parliament followed 
by a referendum to amend the constitution. Article 43 of the Austrian constitution requires a referendum 
for legislation that amends the fundamental principles of the constitution. Government and opposition 
parties agreed that accession to the European Union constituted such an amendment. In Denmark, 
referenda are necessary for legislation involving any surrender of Danish sovereignty to an international 
body that does not receive the support of five-sixths of the Folketing (Article 20). Three of its five 
referenda on European integration have been so triggered. Most of the remaining referenda on European 
integration have been held to shunt decision making from the government to the public because the 
governing party was deeply split, or because the government went along with calls for a referendum in 
the face of public divisions. The 1975 accession referendum in the UK is an example of the former. It 
was an innovative piece of constitutional engineering to minimize the consequences of dissension in the 
leadership of the governing Labour Party. Harold Wilson, the Prime Minister, had made his career as a 
conciliator, and took the opportunity to shift the decision beyond his divided cabinet to the public, in the 
solid expectation that the vote would be positive. Since that time, the hope or threat of a referendum has 
hovered over debate in Britain on Economic and Monetary Union. The last two Danish referenda in 
1998 on the Amsterdam Treaty and in 2000 on the Economic and Monetary Union are examples of the 
latter. All parties agreed that the issues would be submitted to a referendum even if they were approved 
by the five-sixths majority in the Danish Folketing. In the eyes of two observers, “this tradition [of 
holding a referendum on EU issues] is very often legitimized with reference to the divided population 
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expect referenda to have an independent institutional effect. The dynamics of a referendum 
campaign are usually harder to anticipate than those of an election campaign, and this is 
particularly the case when an issue does not involve a cleavage or ideological issue, and 
when parties line up in a non-traditional manner (Leduc 2001). Compared to general elec-
tions, this volatility weakens the control of mainstream party elites, which tend to be sup-
portive of European integration, and lowers the threshold for extreme parties and single-
issue groups that seek to frame the issue in terms of exclusive nationalism.14 
 
Figure 4: What Explains the Power of Exclusive National Identity? 
 
Legend: 
*** significant at the 0.001 level, ** significant at the 0.01 level, * significant at the 0.05 level. 
Italicized figures are squared multiple correlations. Non-italicized figures are standardized regression weights 
estimated by full information maximum likelihood. 
Relative fit index (Delta NFI) = 0.981. 
N = 14. 
 
The structural equations model in Figure 4 allows us to test these expectations. The 
dependent variable is the statistical power of Exclusive National Identity on Support for 
European integration, illustrated in Figure 3.15 Chiefly, we expect 1) the extent of political 
                                                                                                                                                    
and the many narrow ‘yes’ or ‘no’ majorities—the logic being that . . . major decisions cannot be made 
without consulting the voters” (Buch and Hansen 2002, 9).  
14  The prototypical example of a referendum where extreme parties and single-issue groups almost 
defeated an issue notwithstanding broad support among the mainstream parties is the French referendum 
on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 1994).  
15  Our independent and intervening variables are drawn, for the measure of elite divisions, from the 
National Elites Survey (Spence 1997, available on http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/ 
archives/top); divisions among political parties, from the 1999 Marks and Steenbergen dataset on 
political party positions on European integration (available on http://www.unc.edu/~marks); elite/public 
How divided are 
national elites? 
Has the country 
held a 
referendum? How divided 
are political 
parties? 
Causal power of 
exclusive national 
identity 
How large is the gap 
between elite and public? 
0.80*** 
0.29* 
0.52*0.56** 
0.2
0.62*** 
0.35* 
0.16 
0.49*
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division on European integration in a country to affect whether there has been a referen-
dum on the issue; 2) the experience of referenda to have an independent effect on support 
for European integration; and 3) the extent of political division in a country to have an 
independent effect on support for European integration. As one can see in Figure 4, these 
expectations lead us to draw seven arrows across five variables. The assumptions con-
straining the model are weak in the sense that they allow multiple causality, and this 
reduces the degrees of freedom to three. Nevertheless, we find that the model is broadly 
consistent with the data, except for two of the hypothesized effects, which are insignificant, 
but positive in sign. We can estimate the combined direct and indirect effect of each inde-
pendent and intervening variable. The total standardized effect of elite/public division on 
the power of exclusive national identity is 0.68; that for elite divisions is 0.47; and that for 
party divisions is 0.35. The total standardized effect for referenda is 0.35. Together these 
variables account for four-fifths of the variance on our dependent variable. 
To summarize: exclusive national identity is a powerful brake on support for European 
integration, and its power is greater in countries where political divisions on European 
integration run deeper. National identity is framed in national contexts by the mobilization 
of opposing views on European integration. Political events and discourse may—or, in 
some countries, may not—construe for individuals that national identity is contradictory 
with support for European integration. In short, national identity is profoundly shaped by 
politics.  
Surprisingly for us at the beginning of our research, but surprising no longer, is that a 
similar contextual story can be told for perceived cultural and economic threat. The causal 
influence of Perceived Cultural Threat and Perceived Economic Threat, like Exclusive 
National Identity, varies widely across countries, and there is a common pattern of varia-
tion among the three. The country slopes for these variables are strongly correlated, with 
values from 0.89 to 0.95. Recall from Table 2 that we operationalize Perceived Cultural 
Threat and Perceived Economic Threat as orthogonal variables: at the individual level they 
are random with respect to each other. The pattern we see among countries is, then, 
entirely contextual, and it is little different from the one we investigated in Figures 3 and 4. 
It is worth noting that the effect of perceived cultural and economic threat on support for 
European integration is unrelated to the absolute level of perceived threat. So while a larger 
proportion of Greeks show concern about the effects of European integration on their 
national identity and culture, language, or institutions, than do Swedes or Danes, Greeks 
translate these fears far less consistently into Euroskepticism than do Scandinavians. 
Similarly, perceptions of economic threat run deeper among Belgian, Dutch or Greek 
                                                                                                                                                    
divisions, from the “membership question” and the “benefit question” in Eurobarometer 54.1 and the 
National Elites Survey; referenda from Hug (2002) and Leduc (2001).  
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respondents than among Danes or Swedes; that is, more people fear that building Europe 
costs too much money, means less EU subsidies for their own country, makes things more 
difficult for farmers, means that richer countries pay more, and transfers jobs to other 
countries. Yet the effect of perceived economic threat on support for European integration 
is much less pronounced in the former than the latter countries. 
One last question before we discuss our remaining results: Do individual attributes affect 
citizens’ response to political divisions? Does the impact of these contextual factors vary 
across individuals, and if so, why? The answer is yes for the well-established reason that 
the greater an individual’s political awareness, the more likely he or she is to pick up and 
process elite cues (Zaller 1992; Inglehart 1970a; Wessels 1995b). Individual political 
awareness, which we measure as Knowledge and Opinion Leadership, amplifies the effect 
of having a political referendum. In countries with a referendum, the gap in support 
between those with exclusive national identity and those with multiple identities widens 
with greater political awareness. Among the 25 percent least knowledgeable individuals, 
the difference is 17.7 percent, and it increases to 24.5 percent among the top quartile. In 
countries without a referendum, the gap remains a stable 17 percent. Moreover, Euroskep-
ticism has a harder edge in referendum countries. While, in general, greater political 
awareness leads to higher support for European integration, this is not so among exclusive 
nationalists in referendum countries. They persist in their Euroskepticism: from 46.6 per-
cent support on our 100-scale to 47.8 percent among the most knowledgeable. Euroskepti-
cism among exclusive nationalists in non-referendum countries appears softer: support for 
European integration increases from 57.7 percent among the bottom 25 percent to 64.6 
percent among the top quartile.16 Political divisions among elites encourage polarization 
among the politically aware.  
We find support for Lauren McLaren’s thesis that opposition to European integration 
taps deep-seated fears. Yet the connection of such emotions to European integration is not 
automatic. It is mobilized in political conflict. Exclusive national identity and cultural and 
economic fears are interpreted—constructed—in contrasting national contexts. 
                                                 
16  The results are similar for opinion leadership. In referendum countries, the gap between individuals with 
exclusive and multiple identity widens from 24.3 percent among the bottom quartile on opinion 
leadership to 30.7 percent among the top quartile, while in non-referendum countries it creeps up slightly 
from 16.2 percent to 18.4 percent. Euroskepticism deepens among exclusive nationalists in referendum 
countries—from 45.0 percent among the least politically aware down to 41.0 percent among the top 
quartile in opinion leadership. This contrasts with exclusive nationalists in non-referendum countries, 
where the respective figures are 60.0 percent and 64.1 percent. 
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Cues and Calculations 
How do alternative explanations fare under the controls we exert? Table 5 estimates the 
marginal effects of three sets of variables for public opinion on European integration in the 
absence of controls and under full controls. The first column estimates the marginal reduc-
tion in the deviance when the variables associated with each model are introduced as the 
first variables in our base model. The second column estimates the marginal reduction in 
the deviance when these same variables are introduced in the presence of all other vari-
ables listed in Table 2. Columns three to eight estimate the effect of variables in each 
model in reducing variance at the national, party, and individual levels as a percentage of 
the total variance at each level in the sample. We do this both in our base model (i.e. under 
no controls) and in the full model (i.e. under full controls).  
 
Table 5: Marginal effects 
 Percentage decrease in varianceb 
 
Overall decrease in 
deviancea at country level at party level at individual level 
 base 
model 
full 
model 
base 
model 
full 
model 
base 
model 
full 
model 
base 
model 
full 
model 
National Identity Model 1567 1176 65.5 23.4 58.1  18.9 13.3 
Political Cues Model 119 83   80.1 30.0   
Political Economy Model 540 240 66.5 25.8 23.5  6.9 2.5 
a Overall decrease in deviance (-2*log-likelihood) when variables are introduced as the final variables in the base model 
(column 1) or as the first variables in the full model (column 2). Differences in the deviance between models follows a 
chi-squared distribution. The National Identity model uses 5 degrees of freedom; the Political Cues model uses 3 
degrees of freedom; and the Political Economy model uses 8 degrees of freedom. All models improve the fit at levels 
of significance well beyond conventional yardsticks.  
b Percentage decrease in the variance (as a proportion of the total variance in the base model) at the country, party, or 
individual level when variables are introduced as the final variables in the full model or as the first variables in the 
base model. Only significant estimates (p < 0.01) are reported. 
 
The relative power of the five variables associated with national identity is evident in Table 
5. A national identity model is almost three times more powerful in reducing the deviance 
in our sample than are the variables encompassed by the political economy model, at a cost 
of 5, as opposed to 8, degrees of freedom. When we estimate the marginal effects of these 
models under full controls, the superior power of the national identity model is starker. 
Both models are considerably more powerful than the three variables we group in a politi-
cal cues model, though there is little doubt (p<0.001) that the political cues model has a 
significant effect.  
When we examine estimates of the effects of these models across the levels of our 
model, we gain a more finely-grained picture. The marginal effect of the political cues 
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model is strongest at the party level. Alone, it accounts for four-fifths of the variance at the 
party level, and it is the only model that accounts for a significant amount of additional 
variance under controls. The national identity model and the political economy model have 
similar, powerful, effects in reducing the variance in mean support for European integra-
tion among countries. The difference in the power of these models is mainly at the individ-
ual level, which as we see from Table 3, comprises 78.6 percent of the total variance in the 
sample. 
Party cue is the single-most powerful predictor of variance at the party level, accounting 
for an additional 16.7 percent of the variance under full controls. Alone, this variable 
accounts for an estimated 74.1 percent of the variance at the party level. Party supporters 
tend to have positions on European integration that are close to those of their political 
party. Our data do not enable us to determine whether political parties follow their sup-
porters, or supporters follow political parties, though there are good grounds for believing 
the latter (for contrasting arguments, see Steenbergen and Scott forthcoming; Carrubba 
2001). We confirm Steenbergen and Jones’ finding that the effect of party cueing is greater 
among more politically aware citizens (2002; Zaller 1992, 40-52). The estimated coeffi-
cient for party cue increases from 2.22 (s.e. = 0.24) to 3.62 (s.e. = 0.51) for those in the top 
ten percent. 
We find evidence that public opinion on European integration is influenced by the self-
placement of respondents on a left/right dimension. In general, those on the left are more 
favorably oriented to European integration. But the connection is weak. A shift of one unit 
to the left on the 1 to 10 left/right scale increases support for European integration by 0.37 
percent, as evident in Table 4. This is in line with previous research (van der Eijk and 
Franklin forthcoming; Gabel 1998a, 1998b). As European integration has evolved from 
market-making to polity-making, so left and right have switched positions. But, as we 
expect, the effect of Left/Right Ideology varies across country. In Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark, those on the right are more positively disposed to European integration. In these 
countries, a one unit shift to the right increases support for European integration by 1.64 
percent. An interactive variable, Scandinavia*Left/Right Ideology captures this effect. So, 
Left/Right Ideology is similar to Exclusive National Identity in that its effect depends on 
national context. This is consistent with recent comparative political economy literature 
which argues that the connection between left/right ideology and support for European 
integration depends on which type of capitalism is in place. In countries where social 
democratic and welfare institutions are particularly strong, European integration is likely to 
be interpreted as a drag on welfare spending. In countries, like Britain, where social 
democratic and welfare institutions are much weaker, European integration may have the 
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reverse effect.17 Hence, right-leaning citizens will take opposing positions on European 
integration in Britain and Scandinavia. 
Variables in the political-economy model are potent in reducing country-level variance. 
Structural Funding, a measure of inter-country transfers in European cohesion policy, 
accounts for 23.9 percent of the country-level variance under controls. This confirms 
Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt (forthcoming) and Ray (forthcoming).  
Type of Capitalism is significant but not very influential (see Figure 2). This is a surprise 
(Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt forthcoming; Ray forthcoming). Standard regression analy-
sis underestimates the standard error for Type of Capitalism by a wide margin (compare 
columns two and four in Table 4). Perhaps we have mis-specified this hypothesis. There is 
little doubt that citizens in countries with different capitalist systems tend to have different 
views concerning the welfare state, the labor market, and the role of government in the 
economy (Huber and Stephens 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Iversen and Cusack 2000; 
Lipset and Marks 2001). Furthermore, it is plausible that the preferences of governments 
and interest groups on EU policy are, in part, “a function of how [European] cooperation 
will affect the workings of [the] national market economy” (Fioretos 2001, 239). But the 
implications for public opinion on European integration are not self-evident. The indicator 
we use scores countries on their distance from the median EU country along dimensions: 
1) type of national production system and 2) extent of welfare redistribution. This is defen-
sible but not compelling. There are numerous ways to operationalize dichotomous and 
trichotomous variables to capture variation among 15 countries, and some may fit the data 
better than the measures we have chosen. The least we can say is that our measure is not 
defined with our data in mind.18  
Political-economic factors do not reduce party-level variance very much, and they 
explain only an additional 3 percent or so variance at the individual level. This is not 
impressive given the emphasis in the literature on the economic costs and benefits of 
European integration. Three political-economic variables are significant in our analysis. As 
detailed above, the extent to which respondents’ perceive European integration as an eco-
nomic threat strongly influences Support. Second, support for European integration drops 
by 8.7 percent for respondents who are pessimistic (vs. optimistic) about their personal 
                                                 
17  This was the fear of former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, who exclaimed in her Bruges 
speech in September 1988 that ‘we have not successfully rolled back the role of the state in Britain, only 
to see them re-imposed at a European level’ (Thatcher 1998, 49-54.)  
18  More sophisticated measures would be helpful, for example, taking off from Iversen and Soskice’s 
theory of asset specificity. A plausible approach might parallel the one we have developed for national 
identity. One might investigate how particular country-level political-economic contexts (as measured, 
e.g., by Hall and Gingerich 2001) interact with group characteristics (e.g. low vs. high asset specificity), 
which are then mediated by individual-level characteristics (e.g. gender, income).  
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economic prospects. Third, support for European integration drops by 8.4 percent for 
respondents who are pessimistic (vs. optimistic) about their country’s economic prospects. 
4. Conclusion 
Our findings challenge economic analyses of support for European integration, not because 
we find no support for them, but because we discover something far more potent: national 
identity.  
This makes sense when we examine the course of European integration. European inte-
gration has proceeded by stages, each of which has shifted a limited number of competen-
cies from national states to the European Union. The justification for such institutional 
engineering has, at every stage, been grounded in jurisdictional efficiency, in particular, 
internalizing spillovers and reaping economies of scale in policy delivery. The result is a 
system of multi-level governance in which authority is diffused across local, regional, 
national, and European governments. Constitutional engineering to reap efficiency gains is 
the backbone of functional, neofunctional, and intergovernmentalist conceptions of Euro-
pean integration.  
The founders of the European Union went out of their way to avoid the issue of identity, 
in the belief that European integration was best hitched to pragmatic, mainly economic, 
concerns and to the unassailable argument that efficient public decision-making demanded 
larger jurisdictions than existed in even the largest West European states (Hooghe and 
Marks forthcoming). They hoped to deepen European identity as a by-product of integra-
tion that could be led by elites with the implicit consent of publics. However, the European 
Union has become far more than a means to reduce barriers to trade, or even, more 
broadly, a means to produce certain public goods for citizens in member states. It conveys 
European citizenship; it prints its own money; it holds elections across its entire territory 
for a directly elected legislature with the power to veto most legislation. In short, the Euro-
pean Union is a polity—a self-governing community with authority over those who live in 
its territory. As such it engages the territorial identities of citizens. It is no longer possible 
to conceive of identity as an inert outcome of integration. As European integration has 
moved along a broad policy front, and as one national competence after the other has come 
to be shared with EU institutions, so territorial identity has become an obvious constraint 
on support for the European Union.  
In terms of the broader literature on attitude formation and political choice, our results 
offer a caution and, perhaps, a promising line of inquiry. The caution is that ideological 
contestation—summarized by the left/right dimension—only dominates where the bounda-
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ries of the polity are accepted. Hence, we cannot generalize the findings of the literature on 
political conflict in the United States, focused on contestation about the scope of govern-
ment activity, to situations where the territorial articulation of the polity is itself contested. 
Settled jurisdictional boundaries are the sine qua non of democratic class conflict. Seymour 
Martin Lipset’s enormously influential conception of democratic class conflict rests on the 
presumption that the political community is given – which was a fair assumption for post-
war western democracies. The democratic machinery of conflict resolution kicks in only 
where the political community is taken for granted. The end of ideology, as Lipset empha-
sized, applies specifically to the left/right divide. All bets are off when we are talking about 
conflicts over jurisdictional boundaries. Such conflicts engage, as evidenced in this paper, 
basic issues of identity. This is not to claim that economic interests, in their various guises, 
are absent. But it is to claim that the pursuit of economic interest is secondary to communal 
attachments in situations where the political community is itself at issue. Where they clash, 
identity often dominates economic interest. Territorial sources of coalition formation 
dominate ideological sources of coalition formation.  
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